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Abstract
Two experiments are described in which reaction times for understanding
target sentences or phrases in terms of a preceding context were measured.
In Experiment 1, the target sentences followed either short or long contexts
which induced either literal interpretations or metaphorical ones. Results
indicated that only in the short context condition did subjects take
significantly longer to understand metaphorical than literal targets. This
interaction is explained in terms of the availability of appropriate schemata
for interpreting the target. In Experiment 2, targets were phrases that
could be given either an idiomatic or a literal interpretation. It was found
that the comprehension of phrases receiving an idiomatic interpretation took
no longer than the comprehension of those same phrases when given a literal
interpretation, and there was some evidence that idiomatic interpretations
were consistently faster. It is argued that both experiments can be
accounted for in terms of contextually generated expectations. The processes
required for the comprehension of figurative and literal uses of language
seem to be essentially similar.
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Interpreting Metaphors and Idioms:
Some Effects of Context on Comprehension
While philosophers have been speculating about the nature of metaphor at
least since the time of Aristotle, psychologists have only recently begun
seriously to investigate it. Most of their work has been concerned with
developmental trends and suffers from a variety of conceptual and
methodological problems (see Ortony, Reynolds & Arter,in press). Yet
metaphor is an important problem in cognitive psychology. Explaining
metaphor constitutes a challenging test for theories of similarity judgments
(e.g., Tversky, 1977) and analogical reasoning (e.g., Sternberg, 1977) as
well as for theories of language comprehension in general.
One approach to the analysis of the comprehension of metaphors is the
Pragmatics approach based on recent work of Grice (1975), Searle (1969; in
press), and others, who suggest that linguistic communication is governed by
a tacit agreement to cooperate in the communicative act. According to Grice,
apparent violations of this agreement serve communicative functions. When a
hearer (or a reader) discovers an apparent violation, he or she tries to
reinterpret what was said so as to render the violation only apparent.
Typical examples of such violations occur in indirect speech acts where one
kind of illocutionary force (e.g., that of assertion, as in, It's cold in
here) is used to convey another kind of illocutionary force (e.g., that of a
request, perhaps to close a window or turn up the thermostat). Searle (in
press) suggests that metaphors also involve such violations. He argues that
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the chief difference between the two is that when using an indirect speech
act the speaker intends to communicate both the literal meaning of what is
said and the conveyed meaning. By contrast, when using a metaphor the
speaker's goal is to convey only the metaphorical meaning. In both metaphors
and indirect speech acts, the hearer's task is to figure out what the speaker
meant (utterance meaning) from what he said (sentence meaning), given that
the context makes it clear that the two are different, and that in that
context the sentence meaning is defective. This "figuring out" entails that
the hearer must first process the literal meaning of the utterance to a
sufficient extent to determine whether or not it is compatible with the
context. If it is not, the hearer has to engage in further processing to
determine the utterance meaning.
Searle's analysis of the comprehension process for metaphors, therefore,
entails three stages. First, the literal meaning of the utterance is
determined. Second, that meaning is checked against the context. Third, if
there is a conflict between the literal meaning and the context, it is
reinterpreted and a conveyed meaning is derived. Clark and Lucy (1975)
tested three predictions of just this model to determine whether it would
provide a reasonable account of the comprehension process involved in
sentences expressing indirect speech acts. One prediction was that subjects
would show evidence of having processed the sentences literally. A second
prediction was that indirect requests would take longer to be understood than
direct requests. The third prediction was that subjects would show evidence
of having derived a reinterpreted meaning. The subjects' task involved
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verifying whether direct and indirect, positive and negative requests had
been fulfilled. Response times were compared with predicted patterns for
verification times of positive and negative statements. Clark and Lucy
interpreted their results as strong direct support for the first and third
predictions, and as reliable indirect evidence for the second.
Focusing on metaphors, Verbrugge and McCarrell (1977) presented subjects
with a series of metaphorical sentences such as Billboards are warts on the
landscape. They reasoned that comprehending these sentences would involve
determining the "ground," namely the shared meaning components of the
metaphorical "topic" (in this case, billboards) and the metaphorical
"vehicle" (in this case warts). They further argued that if comprehension
did indeed require the determination of the ground then the ground should be
a very effective retrieval cue. They found this to be so. Thus, for
instance, the ground in the example just given, ugly protrusion on a surface,
was a much better retrieval cue than was the ground tell you where to find
businesses in the area, which in turn was more effective for a control
metaphor, Billboards are the yellow pages of a highway. These results
suggest that the comprehension of metaphors requires subjects to make
inferences about what the ground of a metaphor is-- inferences that would
not be necessary in the comprehension of literal statements such as
Billboards are ugly protrusions on the landscape. A reasonable extrapolation
from their results is that the additional inferences necessary for the
comprehension of metaphors will manifest themselves in increases in
processing time.
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In both lines of research described above, an increase in processing
time for metaphors seems to be indicated even though the theoretical origins
are rather different. Clark and Lucy can be regarded as testing a general
model for the comprehension of non-literal uses of language, which they claim
involves three stages. Verbrugge and McCarrell can be regarded as
investigating what is involved in the third, reinterpretation, stage. It has
been argued, however, that the comprehension of metaphors does not involve
stages of comprehension. Verbrugge (i1977), for example, suggests that such a
model is unparsimonious. He proposes instead that all language, metaphorical
or literal, is understood through elaboration processes that are constrained
by the context. A similar position is taken by Rumelhart (in press). Harris
(1976), in attempting to repudiate the stage model, found that subjects took
no longer to initiate a paraphrase of a metaphor than they did to initiate a
paraphrase of its literal equivalent, although questions arise as to the
appropriateness of such a dependent measure.
Our proposal is that the stage model is not incorrect but that it
represents a limited rather than a general account of the comprehension of
figurative language. In general we propose that a hearer or reader uses an
already constructed representation of what has gone before (the context) as a
conceptual framework for interpreting a target sentence, or any other
linguistic unit (see, e.g., Bransford & Johnson, 1972; Schallert, 1976). In
many cases the interpretation is quite unproblematic; the reader or listener
can almost predict what will be conveyed, and the target sentence is used, as
it were, to confirm an already formed hypothesis about its meaning. In other
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cases, however, for one reason or another, this fairly automatic,
predominantly top-down strategy is not possible. Such a situation may exist
when, as in the Clark and Lucy and the Verbrugge and McCarrell experiments,
target sentences are presented with minimal or no preceding context. Without
contextual support to guide expectations, the inferential processes entailed
by the stage model and by Verbrugge and McCarrell's analysis may have to be
made quite deliberately. Thus our view is that whether or not a target
sentence requires a relatively large amount of processing time is a function
of how easily it can be interpreted in the light of contextually determined
expectations rather than a function of its nonliteralness. It is incorrect
to assume that nonliteralness always impairs the ease of interpretation. Our
proposal seems to have the following empirical consequences, which were
tested in Experiment 1. First, given insufficient contextual support,
targets requiring a metaphorical interpretation should take longer to be
processed than targets requiring a literal interpretation. Second, given
sufficient contextual support, they should not.
In the first experiment a number of "vignettes" were constructed. Each
vignette comprised two parts, an antecedent context and a sentence-length
target. For each item there were two kinds of contexts, one that was
intended to induce a literal interpretation of the target (the literal
inducing context) and one that was intended to induce a metaphorical
interpretation of it (the metaphorical inducing context). The dependent
measure was the time taken for a subject to understand the target. The
procedure was, therefore, similar to that of Haviland and Clark (1974), not
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only with respect to the dependent measure, but also in that antecedent
context was manipulated to alter the interpretation of a target. Note that
in contrast to the metaphors of Verbrugge and McCarrell which represented
semantically anomalous uses of words, our metaphors were contextually
anomalous whole sentences. An example of an item is given below:
Literal Inducing Context
Approaching the enemy infantry, the men were
worried about touching off landmines. They were very
anxious that their presence would be detected prematurely.
These fears were compounded by the knowledge that
they might be isolated from their reinforcements.
The outlook was grim.
Metaphorical Inducing Context
The children continued to annoy their babysitter.
She told the little boys she would not tolerate
any more bad behavior. Climbing all over the
furniture was not allowed. She threatened to
spank them if they continued to stomp, run, and
scream around the room. The children knew that
her spankings hurt.
Target
Regardless of the danger, the troops marched on.
Short contexts were produced from the long ones by using only the first
sentence or part thereof. Thus, in the short context condition the target
Regardless of the danger, the troops marched on was preceded by either
Approaching the enemy infantry or The children continued to annoy their
babysitter.
To summarize our position, the general account of comprehension that we
have offered suggests that whether one target will be comprehended more
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quickly than another depends, not so much on whether it has to be interpreted
literally, but upon the extent to which it can be readily interpreted in
terms of a reader's or listener's emerging representation of what has gone
before. This leads to the following two hypotheses:
(1) In cases where there is little contextual support, sentences given
a metaphorical interpretation (hereafter called "metaphors") require more
time for their comprehension than sentences given a literal interpretation
(hereafter called "literals"), i.e., the stage model provides an adequate
account.
(2) In cases where there is abundant contextual support, metaphors are
processed as quickly and easily as literals, i.e., the stage model does not
provide an adequate account.
Experiment 1
Method
Design
The main part of the experiment involved measuring the amount of time it
took for a subject to indicate that he had understood a particular sentence
under different context conditions. Each person was assigned randomly to
list (List A or List B) and order (Order 1 or Order 2) conditions. Context
length (short or long), a between subject factor, was randomly assigned to
small groups of subjects being tested together. Context type (metaphorical
or literal) was a within-subject factor.
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Subjects
Forty students, 4 males and 36 females, were recruited from an
undergraduate general educational psychology class and paid $2 for their
participation.
Materials
Each item consisted of a target sentence which could be interpreted
either literally or metaphorically depending upon the context which preceded
it. A particular target could appear after either a short or a long version
of either a metaphorical-inducing or a literal-inducing context. The items
were written in keeping with the following guidelines: (a) contexts should
induce either clearly metaphorical or clearly literal interpretations of the
targets; (b) the contexts themselves should be written using only literal
language; (c) the target should not merely repeat or translate one of the
context sentences but should be a continuation or summary sentence; and
(d) the degree to which the target follows from the context should be as
equal in the metaphor and literal versions as possible. How well the items
adhered to these guidelines was tested by presenting 23 items to 140
undergraduate students enrolled in a Philosophy of Education course. For
each target, half of the students read the metaphorical context and half read
the literal context. Half of the subjects received short contexts and the
rest long contexts. They were asked to indicate whether a particular target
sentence should be interpreted literally, metaphorically, or whether it was
uninterpretable given the preceding context. In addition, they were asked to
indicate the degree to which a target was related to one of its contexts on a
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7-point scale. Based on these ratings, the 16 items which were most
consistently categorized as literal or metaphorical in their appropriate
context conditions and which showed the highest degree of relatedness to the
context were selected as experimental items. Twenty other items were then
constructed and, together with the 7 rejected items from the norming study,
appeared as practice trials before the experimental items.
The 16 experimental target sentences ranged from 4 to 10 words in length
with a mean of 7 words. Short contexts ranged from 3 to 11 words with a mean
of 6, and long contexts from 33 to 60 words with a mean of 45. For each item
the average difference in length between metaphorical and literal contexts
was 4 words for the long versions and 2 words for the short versions. Two
lists were constructed so that in each list, 8 of the targets appeared after
metaphorical contexts and 8 after literal contexts. Targets requiring a
metaphorical interpretation in List A were interpretable literally in List B
and vice versa. In addition, there was a short and a long context version
for each list and two random orders of the items for each list.
Procedure
All subjects received the same instructions. They were told by an
experimenter that they were participating in a study dealing with language
comprehension. The general form of the items, a context section followed by
a target sentence, was described although no mention was made of the
metaphorical nature of some of the items. The general procedure for
interacting with the computer terminal was then described. The experimenter
explained that a ready signal would be on the screen when they sat down at
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the terminal. As soon as they were ready to begin, they should press the
space bar on the keyboard in front of the screen, causing the first part of
an item to appear. They were told that when they had read and understood
this part, they should press the space bar again, causing the second part to
appear. Then, as soon as they had read and understood this part, they should
press the bar. After a 5-second interval, the ready signal would appear for
the next item. The experimenter reminded the subjects that the target parts
should be understood in terms of the context sections. He discouraged them
from spending an inordinate amount of time on each section and from pressing
the bar before they had understood what they had read.
Subjects were then escorted to individual sound-proofed cubicles, each
equipped with a computer terminal consisting of a small CRT screen and a
typewriter keyboard. The computer system, capable of handling several
subjects simultaneously, regulated the presentation of all items and recorded
the elapsed time in milliseconds between bar presses. All subjects received
27 practice items and then the 16 experimental items without interruption.
Upon completing the main part of the experiment, the subjects were taken
to a small classroom where they were given a posttest. The test consisted of
the 16 target sentences along with instructions to write a brief summary of
how each of these had been interpreted in the first phase of the experiment.
Subjects were discouraged from guessing or making up an interpretation on the
spot. Note that 24 of the subjects participated in the main phase of
Experiment 2 before going on to the posttests for both experiments.
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Results and Discussion
Preliminary analyses were run which indicated that, within context
length conditions, subjects did not differ in the amount of time they spent
reading the metaphorical and literal inducing context sections, F < 1 in all
cases. Also, order of items was not a significant factor, nor did it
interact with other factors in analyses of reaction times for the targets.
Therefore, order was dropped as a factor in further analyses.
The amount of time it took for a subject to indicate that the predicted
interpretation had been made and understood was the measure of prime
interest. The data from three subjects were discarded because they did not
have time to complete the posttest. Also, four data points which fell three
standard deviations above individual subjects' mean reaction time on all
targets were removed as well as four data points which were below 700 msecs.
These outliers represented cases in which experimental instructions could not
have been followed; a subject's attention may have wandered from the task, or
he or she may have reacted accidentally before the target could possibly have
been read and understood. In addition, since the reaction time measure did
not allow a direct check of subjects' interpretations and since our
predictions were based on clear cases of metaphorical and literal processing,
answers on the posttest were examined and data points corresponding to
targets which were clearly misinterpreted were removed. Such cases, where
subjects reported that they had interpreted literally targets that were meant
to be metaphorical, or vice versa, amounted to a total of 22 cases (4%). In
comparison, 65% of the posttest answers indicated correct interpretations,
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28% fell in the "forgot" category, and 3% could not be categorized
unambiguously. The scores trimmed from the data (a total of 30 data points
or 5% of the total) were evenly distributed across all levels of the critical
variables.
Analyses of variance were performed with context length (short vs. long)
and list (A vs. B) as between-subject factors, and with context type
(metaphor vs. literal) as a within-subject factor. Figure 1 represents the
Insert Figure 1 about here
mean reaction times for interpreting targets in the various conditions.
Results indicated a significant effect for context length, F1(1,33) = 14.54,
p < .001, FJ (1,15) = 133.18, p < .001, minF'(1,45) = 11.71, p < .01, thusý-2
demonstrating that targets following long contexts were processed more
quickly than targets following short contexts. The context type effect was
also significant, F1 (1,33) = 20.92, p < .001, F2(1,15) = 26.62, p < .001,
minF'(1,40) = 13.11, p < .001, with metaphors taking longer to be processed
than literals. Finally, the interaction of these two variables was
significant, F (1,33) = 5.42, p < .05, F (1,15) = 9.54, p < .01. Although
the minF' for the interaction was only marginally significant, minF'(1,47) =
3.46, p < .075, maxF' did reach conventional levels of significance,
maxF'(1,47) = 4.94, p < .05.
Simple effects analyses of the interaction indicated no significant
difference between metaphorical and literal targets in the long context
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condition, F (1,66) = 2.73, p > .10, but a significant difference in the
short context condition, with metaphorical targets being processed more
slowly than literal targets, F (1,66) = 22.73, p < .001, F (1,30) = 39.92, p
< .001, and minF'(1,95) = 14.48, p < .001.
These results indicate that while subjects took longer to interpret
targets in metaphorical than in literal contexts in the short context
condition, there was no significant difference between metaphors and literals
in the long context condition. Thus, the process of first interpreting a
sentence literally, then determining that such an interpretation does not fit
the context, and finally computing the intended figurative meaning does not
seem to always underlie the interpretation of figurative language.
Surely the stage model does not apply to cases in which a
conventionalized meaning of a nonliteral expression, such as an idiom, is
highly determined by the context. For example, if the context sets up the
expectation that something is rather irritating and annoying, the familiar
expression, a pain in the neck, (or other expressions comparably colloquial
but a little less tasteful), would permit the immediate satisfaction of the
contextually generated expectations. The use of such expressions is highly
conventionalized and, indeed, is very comparable to the use of certain
indirect speech act forms for which we would make similar predictions (e.g.,
can you do x, meaning, please do x; or, do you have a/the x?, meaning, please
give/pass/lend a/the x). So, the account being proposed not only predicts
that under appropriate circumstances, as Clark and Lucy (1975, p. 69) point
out, the stage model would not be supported, but it also predicts that, at
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least in some cases, nonliteral uses of language might be processed faster
than literal uses. Experiment 2 was designed to test this hypothesis.
Experiment 2
Method
Design
Again the measure of prime interest was the time it took subjects to
indicate that they had understood a target phrase under different context
conditions. Subjects were assigned randomly to three lists and to two
different random orderings of each list. Within each list, there were three
types of items: some for which the target was to be interpreted
idiomatically (idioms), others for which the target was an idiomatic phrase
but which should be interpreted literally given the context (literals), and
finally, items which did not include any idiomatic expression but were
literal paraphrases of the idioms. These control items were meant to be
interpreted literally. A final factor, identified as sequence, was related
to whether subjects participated in Experiment 2 only (idioms-first
condition), or whether they completed the main (reaction time) phase of
Experiment 1 before seeing the main phase of Experiment 2 and then going on
to complete the posttest for both experiments (idioms-second condition). The
rationale for this factor was only that of increasing the efficiency of
subject time. It was hoped that there would be no difference between the two
conditions and that the power of the test for a context type effect would be
increased because of the greater number of subjects.
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Subjects
Students in an undergraduate educational psychology class were recruited
and paid $2 for participation. There were 48 subjects in this experiment, 40
females and 8 males.
Materials
Items were constructed in the same general style as items in Experiment
1, a context section being immediately followed by a target. There were
three versions of each item. In the idiom version, an idiomatic expression
such as let the cat out of the bag appeared after a context which induced an
idiomatic interpretation of the phrase. In the literal version, the same
expression appeared following a context which encouraged a literal
interpretation of the target. In the control version, the same context which
appeared in the idiom version was followed by a target which was a literal
paraphrase of the idiomatic expression. The following is an example of the
three versions of one item:
Idiom version
Context: Dean spoiled the surprise that Joan had
been planning for their mother's birthday
party. When he realized what he'd done,
he apologized for having
Target: let the cat out of the bag.
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Literal version
Context: Walking back from the store, Anne
found a kitten which she put in with
her groceries. She got home and her
puppy went wild when she
Target: let the cat out of the bag.
Control version
Context: Dean spoiled the surprise that Joan had
been planning for their mother's birthday
party. When he realized what he'd done,
he apologized for having
Target: revealed the secret.
Items were written in keeping with the guidelines outlined in Experiment
1. However, in this experiment, two additional constraints were imposed.
First was the constraint that each target should be comprised of the
idiomatic expression or its literal translation alone. Second, the literal
translation appearing as target in the control version was not to have more
words than the idiomatic expression. Actual experimental items were selected
following a norming procedure in which 28 items were presented to 70 students
enrolled in a Philosophy of Education course. Subjects read one of the three
versions of each item and indicated whether the target should be interpreted
idiomatically or literally, or whether the target was uninterpretable given
the context preceding it. In addition, they indicated the degree to which a
target followed from a particular context on a 7-point scale. Based on these
ratings, 18 items were selected that were most consistently categorized, and
that were rated as being most closely related to their contexts. Eighteen
additional items were constructed and together with the 9 rejected items in
Interpreting Metaphors
18
the norming study they appeared as practice items before the experimental
ones.
Contexts ranged from 19 to 30 words in length with a mean length of 24
words (approximately half of the length of the long contexts in Experiment
1). The mean number of words was 24.3 for idiom and control contexts and
24.6 for literal contexts. The 18 idiomatic expressions ranged from 3 to 7
words with a mean of 4 words while the literal translations of these idioms,
the control targets, ranged from 2 to 4 words with a mean of 3 words. For
any particular item, the control target was always either the same length as,
or shorter than the idiomatic expression.
Three lists of experimental items were constructed. An equal number of
idiomatic, literal and control versions of items appeared in each list, with
no repetition of items. For example, an item appearing in its idiomatic
version in List A, appeared as a control item in List B, and as a literal
item in List C. Two random orders of each list were constructed.
Procedure
Subjects were instructed exactly as in Experiment 1. They followed the
same procedure with the following two exceptions. Half of the subjects
completed the main phase of Experiment 1, received their payment, and then
completed the main phase of this experiment. Also, all subjects in
Experiment 2 received two types of questions on the posttest. The first type
was essentially the same as in Experiment 1: the subjects were asked to
write down as best they could remember how they had interpreted the target
phrases during the reaction time phase of the experiment. Following this
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they again saw all of the idiomatic phrases and were asked to rate on a scale
from 1 to 4 how well they understood the idiomatic meaning of these and how
often they personally came across or used these expressions.
Results and Discussion
A first analysis involving a comparison of times spent reading the
context segments of the items revealed no differences among groups, p > .20
in all cases. Before analyzing target times, the measure of prime interest,
the data were examined and some data points were removed. These included
reaction times that fell three standard deviations above a subject's own mean
performance, and those which were below 500 msec., amounting to a total of 30
cases, or 3.5% of the data. No more than one data point per subject was
removed for these reasons. On one occasion, a subject did not read the
context segment and her response on that target was discarded. Four-way
analyses of variance were performed with list, order and sequence as between
subject variables and with context type as a within-subject variable. There
was some evidence that the context type effect was significant, F1(2,76) =
5.52, p < .01, and F2(2,34) = 3.01, p < .10. Means indicated that the
control targets and the idiomatic uses of idioms (1487 msecs and 1472 msecs
respectively) were understood more quickly than literal uses of idioms (1682
msecs).
Subjects' responses to questions on the posttest concerning their
knowledge of the idioms were analyzed. The corresponding response times for
those idioms which subjects indicated that they only vaguely understood or
that they did not know at all were removed. These amounted to 5.5% of the
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data. When these response times were removed, as well as the very slow and
very fast times removed in the first set of analyses (total of 9% of the raw
data), results of the four-way analysis of variance indicated a significant
context type effect, F (2,74) = 9.02, p < .001, F2(2,34) = 3.66, p < .05,
minF'(2,63) = 2.60, p < .10, and maxF'(2,63) = 3.51, p < .05. Newman-Keuls
analyses revealed that idiomatic targets (1383 msecs) and control targets
(1486 msecs) were understood significantly more quickly than literal targets
(1677 msecs), p < .01 and p < .05, respectively. Control and idiomatic
targets did not differ from each other significantly.
Subjects' responses to the second posttest, the test of memory for
target interpretations, indicated that in 78% of the cases, the subjects had
interpreted the target as intended. "Forgot" responses occurred for 14% of
the targets while 1% of cases could not be categorized as correct or
incorrect. The 7% remaining represent the 37 instances in which targets
meant to be interpreted literally were, correctly or incorrectly, reported by
subjects to have been interpreted idiomatically. There were also 3 instances
in which subjects reported a literal interpretation of idiomatic items.
Analyses of variance in which the response times corresponding to
misinterpreted targets were deleted, failed to reveal conventionally
significant results for the context type factor. However, mean response
times for idiomatic, literal, and control items were ordered as in the
analyses reported above, and a strong trend was indicated, p < .15. Analyses
in which both posttests, the knowledge of idiom question, and memory for
target interpretation question, were used as a basis for removing data
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points, once again indicated a significant context type effect, F1(2 ,74) =
3.43, p < .05.
In conclusion, the confirmation of the hypothesis that motivated
Experiment 2 must be regarded as somewhat tentative. The data certainly
demonstrate that idioms, a type of figurative language, do not take longer to
comprehend than literal uses of those same expressions, and there are
indications that they seem to be processed more quickly than literal
language.
General Discussion
For the most part, the results confirmed the hypotheses we set out to
test. In Experiment 1 the targets requiring a metaphorical interpretation
under conditions of minimal contextual support took longer to be understood
than those requiring literal interpretations. This difference disappeared
when the context length was increased. Experiment 2 revealed that familiar
idioms are processed as quickly as, if not faster than, syntactically and
semantically comparable literal language.
The most important finding from Experiment 1 is the interaction between
context type and context length. The chief determinant of processing time
was, as predicted, the degree of contextual support, and associated with
that, the transparency of the relationship between a target and its preceding
context. Our explanation of these results is that where there is little
context the expectations that arise from it are insufficiently specific for
the hypothesis/test process to be effective, and metaphors suffer
significantly more than literals. Where there is an abundance of preceding
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context, the process is hardly less effective for metaphors than for
literals. The interaction is also interesting when considered in the light
of Clark and Lucy's (1975) findings. In the short context condition the
present findings can be viewed as a replication of their results (applied to
metaphors), but in the long context condition they cannot be so viewed. Our
expectation, therefore, is that the Clark and Lucy findings would not
replicate if the targets were presented under conditions wherein an
antecedent context enabled subjects to generate correct expectations about
the specific conveyed meaning of the indirect requests. Indeed, Rumelhart
(in press) reports exactly such a study with the outcome being just as we
would predict.
The account of the comprehension process that has been offered so far
has relied heavily on an unexplained notion of "contextually generated
expectations." Although somewhat speculative in nature, a more precise
account in terms of schema theory (see, e.g., Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977) will
now be proposed. Consider first the long context condition for metaphors,
taking the following context as an example:
Severe criticisms of Europe's oldest dictator
came from within Spain and without. For 35 years
Franco was barraged with these constant
criticisms. To the end, the struggle continued
between the ruthless dictator and his critics.
As a subject reads this passage, he invokes several schemata in order to
comprehend it. They include those for Franco, dictator, Spain, criticism,
resistance, persistence, and so on. Now the subject reads the target, The
waves beat relentlessly against the rugged coastline, with these and related
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schemata already primed. The context has generated expectations that the
input that follows it can be largely accounted for in terms of these
schemata. And, indeed, it can, for the target can be accounted for by such
schemata as those of resistance and persistence sufficiently well to permit
those aspects of it that do not fit to be ignored. (Presumably readers set
some criterion of what counts as a sufficient account of an input.) Thus,
the notions of contextually generated expectations and "accounting for an
input" are complementary.
The process underlying the comprehension of literals in the long context
condition is, of course, very similar. Using the same item for an example,
the subject sees:
Iceland's coastal region was windswept. The angry
arctic winds often buffeted the fishing villages
located on the numerous bays and inlets. The
darkening skies and the rising winds announced the
onset of another storm.
The schemata employed in the comprehension of this context presumably include
those for Iceland, coast, villages, bays, storm, wind, sea, waves, and
associated with these, schemata for resistance and persistence again. Thus it
would appear that most of the schemata required to account for the target
would be available, just as they were for the metaphor, and in this case at
least, perhaps one or two more than for the metaphor. So, in both long
context conditions it seems that processing the context activates sufficient
appropriate schemata to enable an account of the target to be arrived at
quite readily, even though there may be slightly more of them available for
literals than for metaphors.
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In the short context conditions, things are rather different. Using the
same example, for the literals the context is comprised of only the first
sentence of the long context, Iceland's coastal region was windswept.
Certainly fewer appropriate schemata can be activated in the comprehension of
this context, and consequently the expectations that can be generated from it
are very vague compared to those in the long context condition.
Nevertheless, many of the schemata that are available will help. In the
short context condition for metaphors, this is not true, for here all the
subject sees is, Severe criticisms of Europe's oldest dictator. There can be
almost no schemata resulting from the comprehension of this statement that
would immediately permit a satisfactory account of the target to be given.
The very slow times found for the short context conditions might be
attributed to a second, related factor. One could regard the subjects as
having to engage in a sort of problem solving. They are given two pieces of
information (context and target) and before they respond they have to
determine some plausible relationship between them. It would be neither
surprising, nor unreasonable, to suppose that under these conditions a
subject might delay generating a more elaborated representation of the
context until after seeing the target. Such a strategy -- the use of a
sentence to clarify and elaborate the interpretation of a preceding one -- is
surely quite common in normal reading and is very likely to be reflected in
an increase in processing time.
We have argued that when the context is read, a number of schemata are
activated, at least some of which can be used to account for the target. Our
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speculations about the relative numbers of appropriate schemata activated by
the contexts in the different conditions seem to accord rather well with the
ordering of reaction times in those conditions. In the long context
condition most of the schemata employed in processing the context can be used
immediately to almost completely account for the literal target. In the long
context condition, again, many of them, but perhaps not quite so many, can be
employed to give a satisfactory account of the metaphorical target. In the
short context condition, not many schemata are available. Those that are
turn out to be very helpful for literal targets, but almost none of them are
immediately helpful in accounting for metaphorical targets. If an account of
this nature is to be accepted, it is, of course, necessary to assume that
there is a close connection between the availability of appropriate schemata
in terms of which a target can be interpreted and the time taken to make the
interpretation. This assumption, however, is a perfectly reasonable one.
When insufficient schemata are available it is to be expected that a subject
will have to introduce schemata not directly activated by the context. In
some cases, as in the short context, literal condition, this may be very easy
if it happens at all. In other cases, as in the short context, metaphorical
condition, the schemata needed may be semantically relatively remote. In
both cases, the scarcity of appropriate schemata, coupled with an abundance
of irrelevant ones, is going to increase the difficulty of accounting for the
input, and consequently the time required to do so.
The position that we are advocating suggests that, in general,
figurative language is processed in much the same way as is literal language.
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What determines the difficulty of processing is not nonliteralness but
relatedness to context. We have argued that relatedness to context can be
high or low for both literal and nonliteral uses of language. Evidence for
this was found in both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. Although one cannot
infer from Experiment 2 that idioms are processed faster than all comparable
literal expressions, it seems to be the case that idiomatic uses of idiomatic
expressions are processed faster than literal uses of them, which are
comparable. This difference is probably due to one of two reasons, or to
some combination of both. First, if one assumes that the relatedness of
target to context was comparable in all conditions, then the familiarity of
the idioms may have led subjects to try to interpret them idiomatically
before trying to interpret them literally. Evidence that subjects will take
longer to respond to the non-preferred interpretation of an ambiguous
expression has been found (e.g., Foss, Bever & Silver, 1968). The second
reason relates to the possibility that the meaning of an idiom may be stored
in much the same way as the meaning of a single lexical item. This would
result in much lower processing demands at the syntactic level than a
nonidiomatic expression of comparable syntactic structure. In this
connection it is interesting to note that the idioms were greater in length
than the control expressions (e.g., let the cat out of the bag is longer than
reveal the secret), yet the mean times for them were, if anything, shorter
than those for the control expressions. Accordingly, it is tempting to
conclude that idioms are actually processed significantly faster than
unambiguous expressions of similar length. If this is indeed the case, it is
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probably due to both of the two factors just described. Conventional uses of
idioms would have a parsing advantage over comparable literal expressions,
while the literal use of an idiomatic expression would be slowed by the
tendency to automatically go for the idiomatic meaning. However, the present
experiment, while suggestive, is not conclusive on this issue.
It might be argued that Experiment 2 should have employed idioms whose
interpretations were as likely to be the literal ones as the idiomatic ones.
In this way, the disadvantage suffered by the less preferred meaning would
have been eliminated. However, this would have necessitated using much less
familiar idioms and subjects who were not familiar with them would, for the
most part, have contributed nothing to the data. This is because most idioms
are not "frozen" metaphors. If the idiomatic meaning is not known, it
cannot, as a rule, be figured out like the meaning of novel metaphors can.
Idioms tend to be instances of frozen metonymy, and are based on often highly
specialized local customs or habits. For example, the idiom "kick the
bucket" derives its origins from an old, and now obsolete, practice in the
South of England. When pigs were taken to be slaughtered, they were
traditionally tied up in such a way that their back legs would be constantly
kicking a beam called a "bucket." Thus, the relationship with dying is a
metonymical one, and one that could not be determined by engaging in those
processes that are usually employed in the comprehension of novel metaphors,
unless one were endowed with this particular piece of esoteric, and for the
most part, useless knowledge. Thus, in general, the comprehension of
unfamiliar idioms cannot be facilitated by using a semantic analysis of the
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expression as can the comprehension of novel metaphors, so the stage model
could not possibly apply. People usually have to learn what an idiom means,
not figure it out. If they have learned it and the idiom is a familiar one,
then its conventional meaning is directly associated with it. If they have
not learned it and it is an unfamiliar one, then very often its conventional
meaning cannot be determined from its literal meaning, although, of course,
it might be determinable from the context alone.
The results of these two experiments lead us to conclude that the
account we have offered is reasonable. In the normal course of events
nonliteral uses of language, be they metaphors, idioms, or indirect speech
acts, are comprehended without any special processing. The predominantly
top-down strategy that is employed in language comprehension enables them to
be comprehended in terms of the preceding context quite naturally. On the
other hand, there certainly are cases where an utterance is insufficiently
related to the context for it to be understood. These cases include literal
as well as nonliteral uses of language. In such cases, it is necessary to
engage in additional inferential procedures, and these seem to be well
captured by the stage model. However, the stage model says nothing about the
nature of the reinterpretation stage. We suggested that the determination of
the ground of the metaphor might represent one such strategy. This should
not be taken to imply that the ground of a metaphor is not determined when
there is adequate contextual support. In unproblematic cases the
determination of the ground is no more and no less than the utilization of
those activated schemata required to account for the metaphor. That is, in
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cases where comprehension proceeds smoothly, the ground does not have to be
"computed". However, in cases where the stage model is the appropriate
description, it does. A reader or listener has to make inferences based on
the available schemata, and on expectations and knowledge about the speaker
or writer, and the speaker's or writer's intentions. This is done quite
consciously when one tries to make sense of obscure poems and other works of
literature. It is perhaps done less consciously in more mundane cases, but
it is done nevertheless.
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Figure Caption
Figure o. Mean reaction times for understanding targets.
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